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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Margarito Rodriguez timely appeals following his conviction for two separate
counts of Sexual Abuse of Y.R. and S.T., after the district court allowed the prosecutor
to proffer unsworn testimony at trial that was inconsistent with the witness' direct
examination testimony.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Margarito Rodriguez was charged by Indictment with Lewd Conduct with a Minor
Under Sixteen and Sexual Abuse of Child Under the Age of 16 Years of Y.R.; two
counts of Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material, Lewd Conduct with a Minor
Under 16 Years, Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of 16 Years and Attempted
Rape of C.S.; and Sexual Abuse of Child Under the Age of 16 Years of S.T. (R., pp.1115.)
Before trial, Mr. Rodriguez pied to all counts involving C.S., but proceeded to trial
on counts I, II and VI involving Y.R. and S.T (R., pp.136-137.) S.T was called to testify
on the first day of trial.

(Tr., p.222, L.17.)

On direct examination, S.T. testified

numerous times she had never seen her dad, Margarito Rodriguez, masturbate.
(Tr., p.228, Ls.5-9.) S.T. reiterated her testimony when questioned by the prosecutor,
Ms. Kallin. 1 (Tr., p.228, Ls.10-13.) Following a break requested by the State, Ms. Kallin
asked S.T. whether they had met before and S.T. responded that they had. (Tr., p.229,
L. 16 - p.230, L.24.) Ms. Kallin then asked S.T. whether she remembered being asked
about seeing her father masturbate. S.T. shook her head no. (Tr., p.230, L.25 - p.231,

It appears, at this point, Ms. Kallin began questioning S.T. instead of Ms. Voss, who
was previously questioning S.T.
1

1

Prosecutor Kallin then asked S.T. whether she remembered talking to Kallin about
to her father's bedroom and opening the door. S.T. responded, "Oh, yeah, yeah,
yeah, yeah." (Tr., p.231 Ls.5-7.) Ms. Kallin questioned S.T. further and elicited ST's
testimony that she went to ask her father if she could go to a friend's house. (Tr., p.231,
Ls.21-24.) His door was open a little bit (Tr., p.231, Ls.22-24.) When she opened the
door, she observed him take his hands out of his shorts and go into the bathroom. 2
(Tr. p.232, Ls.2-4.) She testified she could not see his genitals. (Tr., p.232, Ls.8-10 )
After a two day trial, Mr. Rodriguez was found not guilty of Lewd Conduct with Y.R., a
Minor Under 16 Years, but was found guilty of Sexual Abuse of a Child as to Y.R. and
S.T. (Tr., p.383, Ls.5-16.)

The district court sentenced Mr. Rodriguez to a unified

sentence of eighteen years, with three years fixed, for the offense involving Y.R. (Count
II). (Sentencing Tr., p.423, Ls.7-11.) The district court sentenced Mr. Rodriguez to ten
years in prison with two years fixed plus eight years indeterminate for the count
involving S.T. (Count VI). (Sentencing Tr.. p.424, Ls.8-10.)

On Count Ill (C S ),

Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced to fifteen years fixed, life indeterminate. (Sentencing
Tr., p.423, Ls.12-14.) On Count VII (CS), Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced to five years
fixed and twenty years indeterminate. (Sentencing Tr., p.424, Ls.11-15.) On Count VIII
(C.S.), Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced to five years fixed, twenty years indeterminate.
(Sentencing Tr., p.424, Ls.16-21.)
consecutive to each other.

These sentences were ordered to be served

(Sentencing Tr., p.424, Ls.23-24.)

On Count IV (C.S),

Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced to ten years fixed, twenty-five years indeterminate, to be
served concurrently. (Sentencing Tr., p.424, L.3.) On Count V (C.S.), Mr. Rodriguez

During questioning, S.T. testified he took his hands out of his shorts and went into the
bathroom, but when asked what S.T remembers seeing her father do when he went into
the bedroom testified he was putting his hands in his shorts. (Tr., p.231, Ls.5-7)
2

2

was sentenced to three years fixed and seven years indeterminate, to be served
(Sentencing Tr., p.425,

8-15)

The total sentence the district

imposed was thirty years fixed with life indeterminate.

(Sentencing Tr., p.425, Ls.10-

11.) Mr. Rodriguez timely appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction.

3

ISSUES
1

Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to testify during direct
examination in violation of Mr. Rodriguez's due process rights and right to a fair
trial?

2.

Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to testify without allowing
Mr. Rodriguez to cross examine her thereby violating Mr. Rodriguez's rights
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution?

3.

Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to engage in misconduct
by offering facts not in evidence by allowing the detective to give his opinion
about what he saw on the video, State's Exhibit #19, to the jury?

4.

Did the district court err when it made improper comments on the evidence when
it admonished the Jury to only consider the video and the narrative as it relates to
the charge against the defendant involving S.T., thereby violating
Mr. Rodriguez's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury?

4

ARGUMENT

L
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Testify During Direct
Examination In Violation Of Mr. Rodriguez's Right To Due Process And Right To A Fair
Trial

A

Introduction
The district court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to testify, resulting in the

prosecutor improperly impeaching a witness during the State's direct examination. This
violated Mr. Rodriguez's rights to due process and a fair trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's misconduct or ask for a

curative instruction, Mr. Rodriguez must show the error is fundamental. State v. Draper,
151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011 ); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).

Error is

fundamental if it: 1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional
rights; 2) plainly exists in the record; and 3) was not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
An error is not harmless if there is a reasonable probability that it affected the
outcome. Id. at 226-228.

C.

Relevant Facts
Prosecutor Kallin questioned S.T., during which Ms. Kallin testified about out of

court conversations she had with S.T.

(Tr., pp.222-232.) After introducing S.T., the

State elicited S.T.'s testimony that she was there to tell the truth. (Tr., p.224, Ls.23-25.)
Later, S.T. reiterated she would tell the truth. (Tr., p.225, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Kallin asked S.T.
whether she knew what masturbation was, and S.T. confirmed she did.

Next, the

prosecutor asked her how a man masturbates, and S.T. accurately described it.

5

, p.227, L.25 - p.228, L 1-4.)

S.T. denied seeing her father, Mr. Rodriguez,

masturbate in front of her or other children who lived in the house. (Tr., p.228, Ls.8-13.)
told the jury that she remembered her father calling one of the children away.
(Tr., p.229, Ls.23-25.) S.T. testified she remembers one time she went to the room to
see what was going on. (Tr., p.228, Ls.17-19.) She said her father was standing there
in his boxers. (Tr., p.229, Ls.2-4.) She told the jury she did not see any body parts.
(Tr., p.229, Ls.7-8.) S.T. told the jury she saw her father sitting on the bed, with her
sister, C.S., standing near the door.

(Tr., p.230, Ls.9-10.)

She did not remember

whether her father was clothed. (Tr., p.230, Ls.16-17.) At this point, Ms. Kallin stated
that S.T. had told her in prior out-of-court conversations that S.T. saw Mr. Rodriguez
masturbate once. (Tr., p.230 L.22

p.231, L.4.) S.T. indicated with a nod she never

saw her father masturbate. (Tr., p.230 L.25

p.231, L.4.) S.T. admitted she told the

prosecutor she saw her dad put his hands in his shorts, (Tr., p.232, Ls.5-7.) S.T.
reiterated none of his genitals were exposed. (Tr., p.232, Ls.8-10.) During crossexamination, S.T. testified she did not remember being interviewed by Mrs. Perry who
worked with the Nampa Family Justice Center. (Tr., p.232, L.22 - p.233, L.2.) S.T. also
testified that she remembered telling Mrs. Perry she had never seen her father
masturbate. (Tr., p.233, Ls.3-5.)

D.

The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Testify During Direct
Examination In Violation Of Mr. Rodriguez's Due Process Rights And Right To A
Fair Trial

1.

The Prosecutor's Testimony Was Misconduct Which
Mr. Rodriguez's Due Process Rights And Right To A Fair Trial

Violated

While prosecutors have been afforded great latitude in argument, there are limits
that, if exceeded, can constitute reversible error. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470
6

U

.1, 9 & n.7 (1985); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000); State v. Porter, 130
786 (1997); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521 (Ct App. 2001 ); State v. Priest,

1

Idaho 6, 14 (Ct. App. 1995). Argument "may not misrepresent or mischaracterize

the evidence," or "misrepresent the law or the reasonable doubt burden." State v.
Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007). The Supreme Court will set aside a

conviction for prosecutorial misconduct when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to
result in fundamental error. Porter, 130 Idaho at 785. A defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial is violated when "a prosecutor attempts to have a jury reach its decision on
any factor other than the law set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted
during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence."
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 452 (2012) (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 227).

Fundamental error exists if the arguments are so egregious and inflammatory that
prejudice could not be remedied by instructing jurors to disregard them. State v. Smith,
117 Idaho 891, 898 (1990).
Moreover, Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7(a)("IRPC") prohibits attorneys
from testifying in a case in which

the attorney is involved. Specifically, IRPC 3.7(a)

states:
a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely
to be a necessary witness unless:
1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship
on the client
IRPC 3.7(a)
The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of prosecutors acting as
witnesses by presenting unsworn testimony at trial but only from an evidentiary
7

standpoint In State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22 (Ct. App. 2009), the defendants robbed a
and were followed by a patron who saw them get in a car. Id. at 24. The
witness (Mr. Ha) testified he did not see a fourth person sitting in the car. Id. at 26. On
cross-examination, Mr. Ha admitted he had never told anyone at the prosecutor's office
he had seen the perpetrators get into a car. Id. At this point the prosecutor interrupted
cross-examination and stated in front of the jury, without objection:
I'll represent to the court and counsel that I interviewed Mr. Ha for the first
time in my office in the last few days. I asked him, at that time, whether he
saw or was in a position to see the persons who left the restaurant go into
the car. And he indicated to me, at that time that he was in a position to
see that. So, I had heard that before. I heard counsel ask him had he ever
said that to law enforcement or a prosecutor. I was present when he told
me a couple of days ago, Judge.
Id.
The defendants later moved to strike the prosecutor's comment. Id.
This description to the jury of the prosecutor's version of his discussions
with the witness was improper unsworn testimony by the prosecutor. No
person may testify in court unless first placed under oath. I.RE. 603. By
contradicting Mr. Ha's testimony this way in front of the jury, the
prosecutor, in effect, presented his own unsworn testimony in violation of
this rule and in violation of I.RE 103(c). "In addition, it constitutes
misconduct for a prosecutor to place before the jury facts not in evidence."
Gerardo, 147 Idaho at 26 (quoting State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980)).
The Court found the prosecutor's statement to be error, albeit harmless,
reasoning:
The prosecutor's statement in front of the jury is more troubling, but we
conclude that it also was harmless. In cross-examining Mr. Ha, defense
counsel was attempting to impeach Ha's testimony about the absence of a
fourth man in the getaway car by emphasizing that Ha had not previously
revealed this observation in his statements to the police or to the
prosecutor. Gerardo asserts that the prosecutor's contradiction of Ha's
cross-examination testimony rehabilitated this prosecution witness and
undercut Gerardo's defense that although he may have been in the
getaway car, he was not one of the gun-wielding perpetrators that entered
the restaurant. We do not agree with Gerardo's assessment that the
8

prosecutor's statement diminished Gerardo's impeachment of Ha. The
prosecutor did not contradict Ha's admission that he had never mentioned
to investigating officers that he could see into the getaway car as the
perpetrators entered it. Rather, the jury remained informed that Ha had
not revealed this observation to any state agent until he met with the
prosecutor days before trial. The impeachment potential of this
circumstance, with the implication of some revision of Ha's story after
speaking with the prosecutor, is equal to the impeachment value of the
circumstance that was contradicted by the prosecutor's statement.
Further, no actual evidence of the existence of any fourth man in the
automobile was ever presented at trial. Gerardo's efforts to suggest the
possibility that he was a fourth man solely by cross-examining police
officers about their inability to see how many men were in the car was an
extremely thin reed on which to predicate a defense.
Id. at 27-28.

The Court concluded because the prosecutor's statement had little effect on the
outcome of the trial, it was harmless.

It is important to note that the prosecutor's

unsworn statement was made during cross-examination. and the court seemed to be
swayed by the fact the statement was made in rebuttal to a defense. Id. at 27-28. The
Court addressed the issue only from an evidentiary standpoint.
Courts have addressed this issue in a similar fashion, only from an evidentiary
standpoint. For example, in United States v. Puca, 436 F. 2d 761 (2d. Cir. 1971 ), the
Second Circuit court found prejudicial error in the practice of a prosecutor placing his
own credibility before the jury when he introduced a post-arrest, unsworn, out-of-court
statement which implicated defendant, when questioning a witness.

Similarly, in

Roby v. State, 587 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1978), the court reversed a conviction when a

prosecutor presented unsworn testimony regarding a previous telephone conversation
he had with a witness. The court stated "the prosecutor is, in a real and not too subtle
way, presenting unsworn testimony concerning his part of the telephone conversation."
Id. at 647.

9

Other courts have taken a broader view of this issue.
and Kentucky examine this

For example, both

not only from an evidentiary standpoint, but

as a violation of due process. See Dean v. State, 615 S.W. 2d 354 (Ark. 1981 ). In
Dean, the prosecutor questioned an expert who evaluated the defendant.

Id. at 355.

The prosecutor elicited testimony that it was the expert's belief the defendant would
very likely do this type of thing again. Id. at 355-56. After an objection and motion for a
mistrial, the Court sustained the objection but denied the motion for a mistrial, instead
admonishing the jury to disregard the prosecutor's question and the expert's response.
Id. at 356. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the trial court should have

granted the motion for a mistrial:
The question by deputy prosecuting attorney Crowe did not simply seek to
elicit testimony from the witness, but, in effect, made a clear statement of
fact amounting to testimony by him under the guise of cross-examination.
The statement by Mr. Crowe, a judicial officer, was made for the sole
purpose of convincing the jury that if appellant were allowed to remain free
there was expert opinion that he would again commit the crimes for which
he was then on trial. This testimony by a court official was a flagrant
violation of appellant's right to a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by
the Arkansas and United States Constitutions and was so clearly
prejudicial that the error could not be removed by the trial court's
admonishing statement.
Dean, 615 S.W 2d at 356.

Kentucky courts have adopted a similar analysis

See Holt v. Commonwealth,

219 S.W.3d 731 (Ky. 2007). In Holt, the prosecutor offered t~stimony from a witness
who was in jail with the defendant.

Id. at 733.

Prior to the witness testifying, the

prosecutor questioned him. Id. On direct, the witness denied the defendant admitted to
the crime. Id. The prosecutor asked the witness whether he talked to the prosecutor
that morning, and whether the witness told the prosecutor the defendant confessed to
the crime.

Id.

The lower court overruled an objection, the witness answered the
10

question and the defendant was ultimately convicted.

On appeal, the Kentucky

Court overturned the conviction, stating:
From the foregoing, it is clear that despite Bell's denial of the substance of
the statements attributed to Appellant, the prosecutor asserted on at least
four occasions that Bell told her that Appellant had admitted the crime.
The Commonwealth rested its case without calling any other witness;
there was no witness who impeached Bell's denial of Appellant's alleged
statement. Nevertheless, the prosecutor stated in her closing argument, "I
will say this and end it quick. The Commonwealth would never have
wasted your time, if it had known what it was going to get out of Mr. Bell. I
will move on." The effect of the prosecutor's questions asserting what Bell
had said to her placed the prosecutor in the position of making a factual
representation. From the tenor of her leading questions to Bell, there is no
doubt that she put the very words Bell refused to say in his mouth. The
jury was thus informed that Bell had told the prosecutor that Appellant had
admitted the robbery. This placed the credibility of the prosecutor before
the jury, and from the form of the questions, firmly represented to it that
Bell had told her that Appellant had admitted the crime.
Id. at 734.

The Holt Court pointed out that courts in Kentucky have, for more than a century,
rebuked prosecutors providing unsworn testimony disguised as examination:
"[t]he conduct of the commonwealth's attorney was very reprehensible,
and he should have been punished by a heavy fine. It is the duty of a
commonwealth's attorney to represent the interest of the commonwealth
fully and fairly, with his utmost ability; but it is not his duty to make a
statement of fact, the credence of which is always more or less
strengthened by his official position, outside of the record or evidence,
which may tend in the least degree to prejudice the rights of the accused."
Holt, 219 S.W.3d at 734 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 7 S.W. 155 (1888)).

The Holt court acknowledged other courts had rejected this practice:
In U.S. v. Shoupe, [548 F.2d 636 (6 th Cir.1977)], the prosecutor went on to
ask the witness over seventeen questions incorporating the substance of
his prior out-of-court statements. The court noted that it could "find no
precedent sanctioning the recitation," and that [c]ourts have condemned
this practice as cloaking potentially self-serving accounts of a witness's
statements with the dignity and credibility of the prosecutor's office,
(citation omitted), as increasing the probability that the jury will consider
the statements as substantive evidence despite any limiting instruction to

11

the contrary, . . . and as bypassing, to the prejudice of the defendant,
reasonable alternative measures to accomplish the same legitimate result
736-37 (internal citations, quotations and footnote omitted)
The Court then addressed whether the error was harmless. The Court
acknowledged it was not, stating:
[w]hen the prosecutor effectively became a witness and confessed guilt for
the defendant as if the confession came from his lips, the error was
particularly egregious. A confession is devastating evidence of guilt, but, if
possible, its effect is elevated when the prosecutor becomes the
defendant's voice. When that happens, the defendant's bundle of
constitutional rights evaporates.
Id. at 738.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has previously addressed the subject of
unsworn testimony given by a police officer, but not a prosecutor.

See US. v.

Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1977). In Ragghianti, the Court examined the use of

prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence rather than impeaching the
witness. Id. at 1381. In Ragghianti, the direct testimony of the witness contradicted the
government's theory and supported the defendant's alibL Id. at 1380. The government
then called an F.B.L agent who testified, without objection, to statements the witness
made which were inconsistent with her direct testimony.

Id.

The statements, as

testified to by the F.B.I. agent, tenuously contradicted not only her testimony, it also
contradicted the defendant's testimony. Id. The Court found "this was hearsay of the
worst variety, incapable of being countered by direct evidence." Id. (citations omitted).
The Court discussed the difference between the use of hearsay evidence as proof of
substantive facts and its use merely for impeachment.
There is, after all, a difference between a prior statement obtained from a
witness by the police in the course of a criminal investigation, and
testimony given under oath in a formal proceeding. There are several
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reasons for treating such statements differently, all of which have been the
subject of learned comment which need not be harrowed here .

. . .Although the difference in the use of a prior statement for impeachment
but not as substantive evidence may be subtle, it has been held that
proper implementation of the rule requires an explicit admonition to the
jury by the court at the time a prior inconsistent statement is admitted, and
also an instruction at the close of the trial, that the statement may be
considered only as bearing on credibility. And where in that case, as here,
neither was done, the Bartley court held it to be plain error under Rule
52(b) requiring a new trial despite the lack of objection to the admission of
the prior inconsistent statement or any request by counsel for the defense
thereafter to caution or instruct the jury with respect to the limited role of
the statement.

Ragghianti, 560 F.2d at 1381 (internal citations, quotations and footnotes omitted). See
also State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 74 (2011) (explaining impeachment is that which
is designed to discredit a witness, i.e., to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by
bringing forth the evidence which explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his
testimony).
In the instant case, the unsworn testimony was not introduced for impeachment but
was introduced as evidence in the State's case-in-chief. (Tr., pp.230-231.) At the time
of its introduction, no explicit admonition was tendered to jury. Moreover, no instruction
limiting the use of the prosecutor's unsworn testimony for impeachment purposes was
given at the close of trial. The Court's failure to provide such limiting instructions armed
the jury with the ability to rely on the unsworn statement as substantive evidence to
convict Mr. Rodriguez.

2.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Plain On Its Face

The second prong of Perry is met as it is clear from the record Ms. Kallin
testified, without Mr. Rodriguez having a chance to confront and cross examine her.
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to
13

believe that Mr. Rodriguez's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by failing to
and allowing the prosecutor to provide unsworn testimony. There is simply no
strategic advantage that can possibly be gained by failing to object to, and

to ask the

court to disallow the prosecutor from providing unsworn testimony without cross
examination. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face.

3.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless

Mr. Rodriguez asserts that the jury's consideration of the prosecutor's unsworn
testimony, during direct examination, is fundamental error because it affects "the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process
itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-308 (1991). Even though the Court in
Gerardo concluded the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to present

unsworn testimony, because it violated Rules 103(c) and 603 of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence, the Court also found the prosecution's actions amounted to misconduct,
placing before the jury facts not in evidence.

Gerardo, 147 at 26.

However, the

Gerardo Court neyer addressed the prosecutor's offer of unsworn testimony, in its case-

in-chief, to rebut a prior inconsistent statement by its own witness as a constitutional
violation.
Although the precise issue presented here has never been directly decided in
Idaho, the error affected Mr. Rodriguez's entire trial. Prior to opening statements, the
district court instructed the jurors in a way which empowered the jury to consider the
prosecutor's unsworn testimony. First, the court appropriately told the jury that opening
statements are not evidence. (Tr., p.168, L.25 - p.169, L.1.) Second, immediately prior
to openings, the Court accurately told the jury "you must decide the case only on the
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evidence received in court." (Tr., p.179, Ls.15-17.) These two instructions empowered
jury

accept any testimony introduced at trial, even if it was unsworn.

During

opening statement, Prosecutor Voss gave the jury an overview of the evidence that
would be presented, telling jurors "you will also hear from the defendant's other
daughter, [S.T.] She's 14 today.

[S.T.] will also talk to you about seeing her father

masturbate in front of her." (Tr., p.181, Ls.4-7.) Prosecutor Voss also told the jury they
would hear from Canyon County Detective Michael Bryant, who would testify that the
video in this case, State's Exhibit 19, revealed "[S.T.] comes into the picture, behind the
step-daughter, and sees her father masturbating." (Tr., p.182 L.16 - p.183, L.5.)
The preliminary instructions empowered the jury to consider the prosecutor's
unsworn testimony. The State introduced Prosecutor Kallin's testimony during its casein-chief which was inconsistent with the witness' sworn testimony.

The court never

limited the prejudice by instructing the jury that the evidence referenced in the opening
statement regarding this unsworn statement is NOT to be considered evidence at trial.
Twice this improper testimony was referenced in the opening.

Both times, the Court

empowered the jury to consider unsworn, inconsistent testimony.
The prejudicial impact of the prosecutor's improper testimony is borne out by the
jury's questions. During deliberations, the jury returned with two questions, only one of
which is relevant here. (Tr., p.371, L.6

p.380, L.11.) Jurors asked, "Instruction 32: Is

inducing, causing or permitting opportunity, To witness an act of sexual conduct,
sufficient cause to establish guilt on point 37 That is to say, if we conclude the victim
did not actually see any sexual conduct, is point 3 satisfied for finding of guilt?"
(R., p.230 (emphasis in original).) The Court, with agreement of the parties, told the jury
to answer the question by reading the instruction. (Tr., p.381, L.4 - p.382, L.5.) This is
15

problematic for a couple reasons.
allegation

First, Instruction 32 deals specifically with the

Sexual Abuse of a Child S.T The portion

the instruction the jury had a

question about states: "3 the defendant Margarito Rodriguez induced, caused or
permitted S.T (D.O.B: 5/23/2000) to witness an act of sexual conduct." (R., p.217 .)
Nowhere in the instruction were jurors permitted to convict Mr. Rodriguez if they
believed he merely permitted the opportunity for S.T to witness sexual conduct. The
jury's question illustrates, most profoundly, the error that resulted from allowing the
prosecutor to offer unsworn testimony inconsistent with S.T.'s testimony. S.T. testified
she never saw Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. This testimony, if believed, would require the
jury to acquit Mr. Rodriguez of the charge involving S.T. The jury's question reveals the
jury considered the prosecutor's unsworn testimony, in reaching its verdict.

For the

above reasons, Mr. Rodriguez's conviction for counts II, VI should be vacated

11.
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Testify In Violation Of
Mr. Rodriguez's Rights Under The Confrontation Clause Of The Sixth Amendment To
The United States Constitution

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to testify without allowing

Mr. Rodriguez the right to cross-examine her. This violated Mr. Rodriguez's Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
As stated above, because counsel did not object, Mr. Rodriguez must show the

error was fundamental. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011 ). Error is
fundamental if it: 1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional
16

rights; 2) plainly exists in the record, and 3) was not harmless. An error is not harmless
if

is a reasonable probability that if affected the outcome.

C.

at 226-228.

Relevant Facts
The relevant facts are set forth in Issue I (c), supra, and are incorporated herein

by reference.

D.

The District Court Erred By Allowing The Prosecutor To Testify In Violation Of
Mr. Rodriguez's Right Under The Confrontation Clause Of The Sixth Amendment

1.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Affected Mr. Rodriguez's Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause Rights

The prosecutor engaged in misconduct by offering testimony not subject to
cross-examination and violated Mr. Rodriguez's constitutional right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against him. Mr. Rodriguez has a constitutional right to a fair
trial before an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, XIV, § 1; IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 13.
Moreover, the Confrontation Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with witnesses against him." U S.
CONST. amend. VI; see also IDAHO CONST. art. I § 13. The right to confrontation is
fundamental and has been incorporated and applied to state prosecutions through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
The Confrontation Clause only "applies to 'witnesses' against the accused-in
other words, those who 'bear testimony."' Crawford v. Washington, 541 US. 36, 51
(2004).

The United States Supreme Court has determined that the Confrontation

Clause is limited to testimonial hearsay. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-24
(2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. If the statement is testimonial, then its admission is
permitted only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior
17

opportunity to cross-examine the declarant Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59; State v. Hooper,
1

139, 142, 176 P.3d 911, 914 (2007). Any declaration, affirmation, omission,
nonverbal conduct made for the purpose of establishing some fact, qualifies as a

statement

The Supreme Court has not provided a comprehensive definition of

"testimonial," but some guiding principles may be gleaned from that Court's recent
decisions.

Whether a statement is testimonial is determined by looking at the

statement's primary purpose and its similarities to traditional testimony. Davis, 547 U.S.
at 822.

Testimony is defined as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the

purpose of establishing or proving some fact" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (alteration in
original;

citation

omitted).

Therefore,

a statement

is testimonial

when

"the

circumstances objectively indicate that ... the primary purpose ... is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis, 547 U.S. at
822. When no such primary purpose exists, the statement is nontestimonial and its
admissibility is governed by state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation
Clause. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011 ). The unsworn statement made by
Prosecutor Kallin was introduced to prove past events, i.e. that S.T. said she saw
Mr. Rodriguez masturbate, even though S.T. testified she never saw Mr. Rodriguez
masturbate. Therefore it is testimonial.
Further, while a statement does not have to be written or made under oath to be
testimonial, the formality of the statement itself and the formality of the circumstances in
which the statement is made are relevant to determine whether it was intended to
establish some fact at trial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 826, 827; see, e.g., State v. Shackelford,
150 Idaho 373 (2010) (the totality of the circumstances analysis considers "the formality
of questioning and the extent to which the interview was similar to live testimony"). In
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essence, a statement is testimonial when it is intended to be "a weaker substitute for
testimony at trial." Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Here, the prosecutor's unswom statement was testimonial. Its reliability could only be
tested by the crucible of cross examination. Here, Prosecutor Kallin offered testimony
about statements purportedly made by S.T. Because Mr. Rodriguez did not have the
ability to cross examine the prosecutor, the testimony implicated his Sixth Amendment
rights.

2.

The Error Is Plain On Its Face

The second prong of Perry is met as it is clear from the record Ms. Kallin
testified, without Mr. Rodriguez having a chance to confront and cross examine her.
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to
believe that Mr. Rodriguez's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by failing to
object and allowing the prosecutor to provide unsworn testimony. There is simply no
strategic advantage that can possibly be gained by failing to object to, and to ask the
court to disallow the prosecutor from providing unsworn testimony without cross
examination. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face.

3.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless

Because Mr. Rodriguez did not object to the prosecutorial misconduct during
trial, he bears "the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error
affected the outcome of the trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Mr. Rodriguez asserts that
there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome
of his trial.
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As discussed in Issue I, supra, the prosecutor's unsworn testimony is structural
error. Assuming arguendo, this Court determines it is not structural error, the error
prejudicial. The prejudice is evidenced by the juror's question, asking, "Instruction 32: Is
inducing, causing or permitting opportunity, To witness an act of sexual conduct,
sufficient cause to establish guilt on point 3? That is to say, if we conclude the victim did
not actually see any sexual conduct, is point 3 satisfied for finding of guilt?" (R., p.230
(emphasis in original).) This question most profoundly shows that the prosecutor's
unsworn testimony was considered for its truth by the jury. At each of the previous
instances mentioned above (opening statement, the limiting instruction relating to the
video, and the detective's narration of the video), the Court had the opportunity to
ensure that the unsworn testimony be limited either by a limiting instruction or an
admonition to strike the testimony from the record, but failed to do so. Mr. Rodriguez did
not have an opportunity to confront or cross-examine Prosecutor Kallin. Allowing
unsworn testimony by the prosecutor was not harmless because there is a reasonable
probability the testimony was relied upon by the jury to reach its verdict, thereby,
affecting the outcome of the trial. Therefore, the third prong of Perry is met.
Mr. Rodriguez never had a chance to confront and cross examine Prosecutor Kallin and
therefore, he is entitled to a new trial.
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111.

The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Engage In Misconduct By
Offering Facts Not In Evidence By Allowing The Detective To Give His Opinion About
What He Saw On State's Exhibit 19, A Video, To The Jury

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to engage in misconduct

by offering facts not in evidence by allowing the Detective Bryant to give his opinion,
through a prepared summary, about what he saw on State's Exhibit 19, (the video), to
the jury. This was prosecutorial misconduct which violated Mr. Rodriguez's right to a
fair trial before an impartial jury.

B.

Standard Of Review

Because trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's misconduct or ask for a
curative instruction, Mr. Rodriguez must show the error is fundamental. State v. Draper,
151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011 ); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).
fundamental if it:

Error is

1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional

rights; 2) plainly exists in the record; and 3) was not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
An error is not harmless if there is a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome.
Id. at 226-228.

C

Relevant Facts

On rebuttal, the State recalled Canyon County Detective Bryant.

(Tr., p.316,

Ls.5-6.) Detective Bryant retrieved video files off Mr. Rodriguez's phones. He explained
to the jury his qualifications and explained how he retrieves files from phones and
computers. (Tr., p.316, L.22 - p.322, L.13.) Detective Bryant identified State's Exhibit
12, a screen shot of two females in a doorway from a yet to be introduced video marked
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as State's Exhibit #19. (Tr., p.328, Ls.14-16.) At this time, the district court admonished
stating "You're about to hear a narrative and view a video recording. You are
to consider the video and the narrative as it relates to the charge against the
defendant involving S.T." (Tr., p.328, L.23 - p.329, L.1.) After this admonishment, the
district court ordered the spectators to leave the courtroom, while Detective Bryant read
a summary to the jury of what he saw on the video. The summary is as follows:
The video begins with a shut door with two towels hanging on the door.
Part of the camera appears to be blocked by a towel. There's a male in a
white and red striped shirt who is naked from the waist down who's seen
pulling on his penis and then he's looking back towards the camera. His
hand and penis is visible and he is masturbating. He repeatedly puts spit
on his penis. He moves to the other side of the room and appears to be
masturbating but his hand and penis is not visible. The male opens the
door and appears to motion towards someone. Begins masturbating
again. He moves away from the door and a girl walks in and sets scissors
on a desk and immediately leaves. The male opens the door wider. The
girl comes back in and leaves and then is called back in again The male
continues to masturbate and then another girl's head is visible behind the
first girl. The male continues to masturbate.
(Tr., p.329, L.24- p.330, L.16.)

D.

The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Offer Facts Not In
Evidence By Allowing The Detective To Give His Opinion About What He Saw
On The Video To The Jury

1.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Affected Mr. Rodriguez's Constitutional
Right To A Fair Trial

While prosecutors have been afforded great latitude in argument, there are limits
that, if exceeded, can constitute reversible error. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470
U.S.1, 9 & n.7 (1985); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000); State v. Porter, 130
Idaho 772, 786 (1997); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521 (Ct. App. 2001) State v. Priest,
128 Idaho 6, 14 (Ct App. 1995). Argument "may not misrepresent or mischaracterize
the evidence," or "misrepresent the law or the reasonable doubt burden." State v.
22

Phillips, 144 Idaho 82 (Ct App. 2007). The Supreme Court will set aside a conviction,

the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error. Porter, 1 30
at 785. A defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is violated when "a
prosecutor attempts to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the law
set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." State v. Adamcik, 152
Idaho 445, 452 (2012) (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 227). Moreover, the requirement
that the State must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is
grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 309 (1979). This standard of proof "play a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure" because it "provides concrete substance for the presumption of
innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies
at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."' In Re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v.

United States,

156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).

Fundamental error exists if the arguments are so egregious and inflammatory that
prejudice could not be remedied by instructing jurors to disregard them. State v. Smith,
117 Idaho 891, 898 (1990). To begin, Detective Bryant's summary shifted the burden of
proving every element from the state. The summary relieves the state of proving
whether Mr. Rodriguez was masturbating. Further, Detective Bryant's summary
contains factual assertions fundamental to Mr. Rodriguez's guilt/innocence. For
instance, in his summary Detective Bryant states the male "appears to be masturbating,
but his hand and penis are not visible." This most clearly illustrates that the detective's
summary introduces and requires the jury to accept as fact that which the summary
itself reveals cannot be determined from the video.
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On three different occasions the

detective's summary states, as fact, the video shows a male masturbating. The
was compounded when the district court told the jurors they could only
this narrative and video as it related to the charges regarding S.T From
summary, the jury is told that the male is masturbating. This is one of the essential
elements of Instructions 32, defining sexual abuse of a child, S.T., which requires the
defendant have intent to gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desire. (R., p.217.) This
"fact" was never introduced in evidence, to the contrary, S.T. testified she never saw
Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. (Tr., p.230 L.25 - p.231, L.4.)

2.

The Error Is Plain On Its Face

The second prong of Perry is met as it is clear from the record Detective Bryant's
summary introduce facts not in evidence, by presenting improper expert testimony,
when he narrated the video. The error and prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain
on its face, and there is no reason to believe that Mr. Rodriguez's counsel was
"sandbagging" the district court by failing to object and allowing the prosecutor to
present improper testimony. There is simply no strategic advantage that can possibly
be gained by failing to object to, and to ask the court to disallow Detective Bryant from
narrating the video. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face.

3.

The Error Is Not Harmless

As discussed above in Issues I and II, supra, the jury had a question regarding
Instruction 32.

(Tr., p.371, L.6 - p.380, L.11.) During deliberations, jurors asked the

court, "Instruction 32: Is inducing, causing or permitting opportunity, to witness an act of
sexual conduct, sufficient cause to establish guilt on point 3?

That is to say, if we

conclude the victim did not actually see any sexual conduct, is point 3 satisfied for
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finding of guilt?" (R., p.230 (emphasis in original).) Instruction 32 deals specifically with
allegation of Sexual Abuse of S.T. (R., p.217.) The jury's question ultimately turned
on

testified she did not see

they believed that S.T. was the victim.

Mr. Rodriguez masturbate and therefore was not a victim of sexual abuse. (Tr., p.23O,
L.25

p.231, L.3.)

Ms. Kallin's testimony, coupled with the court's admonition and

Detective Bryant's summary, is the only evidence that S.T. witnessed her father
masturbate.

The jury, if it believed S.T.. would have to acquit Mr. Rodriguez of the

charge involving S.T. By convicting Mr. Rodriguez under Instruction 32, the jury had to
believe Detective Bryant's summary instead of S.T.'s testimony. Therefore, as it spoke
directly to one of the elements of the offense, the detective's testimony influenced the
jury's verdict. Moreover, as Ms. Kallin's testimony addressed one of the elements of the
offense, it improperly shifted the burden of proving Mr. Rodriguez guilty away from the
state.

The Supreme Court in Ellington recognized "'[e]xpert testimony that concerns

conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing
the juror's common sense and normal experience is inadmissible."'
(quoting

Chapman

v.

Chapman,

147

Mr. Rodriguez's conviction should be vacated.
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Idaho

756,

760

151 Idaho at 66

(2009)).

Therefore,

IV
The District Court Erred When It Made Improper Comments On The Evidence When It
Admonished The Jury To Only Consider The Video (State's Exhibit 19) And The
Narrative As It Related To The Charge Against Mr. Rodriguez Involving S.T., Thereby
Violating Mr. Rodriguez's Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury

A

Introduction
The district court erred when it made improper comments on the evidence by

improperly admonishing the jury, which violated Mr. Rodriguez's due process rights by
denying him his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because counsel did not object to the district court's admonition, it is subject to

fundamental error review. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 442 (2007). To constitute
fundamental error, the appellant must show that the error: (1) affected one of his
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) was clear from the face of the record; and (3)
prejudiced him State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226 (2010).

C.

Relevant Facts
The facts, as they are stated in Issue Ill (C)

reference.
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are incorporated herein by

D

The District Court Erred When It Made Improper Comments On The Evidence
When It Admonished The Jury To Only Consider The Video (State's Exhibit 1 9)
And The Narrative As It Relates To The Charge Against Mr. Rodriguez Involving
S.T., Thereby Violating Mr. Rodriguez's Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial
Jury

1.

The District Court's Error Affected Mr. Rodriguez's Right To A Fair Trial
Before An Impartial Jury

This district court's admonition was a comment on the evidence. A jury can
become biased as a result of comments by the district court: "Remarks or comments by
a trial judge which would tend to prejudice either of the parties to a jury trial are
proscribed because of the great possibility that such an expression will influence the
jurors." State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 711-12 (1976). Moreover, the requirement that
the State must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded
in the constitutional guarantee of due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309
(1979).

This standard of proof "play a vital role in the American scheme of criminal

procedure" because it "provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocencethat bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law."' In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363
(1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). To begin, the district
court's comment that jurors were only to consider the video and Detective's Bryant's
narrative as it related to the charges involving S.T. shifted the burden of proving every
element from the State.

The district court's comments relieve the State of proving

whether Mr. Rodriguez was in the video and whether it was S.T. who was in the video.
Further, it poses a great possibility of influencing the jurors. The only conclusion the
jury can reach after the court's admonition is that S.T. is one of the girls in the video
(State's Exhibit 19).

Moreover, the district court's admonition conveyed to the jurors
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that S.T!s testimony was not credible. That is, S.T. testified she did not see her father
masturbate. Detective Bryant's summary
jury, not the district

the video arguably reflects otherwise. It is

who determines the credibility of witness testimony. It s

also the jury, not the district court, who determines whether S.T. is in the video and
whether Mr. Rodriguez induced, causing or permitted S.T. to witness an act of sexual
conduct

2.

The Error Is Plain On Its Face

The error in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to believe that
Mr. Rodriguez's counsel was "sandbagging" by failing to object to the district court's
improper comment on the evidence by telling jurors the video and narrative only related
to the charge involving S.T. There is simply no strategic advantage that can possibly be
gained by failing to object to the court's improper comment on the evidence. Therefore,
the error is plain on its face.

3.

The Error Is Not Harmless

The prejudice resulting from the district court's improper comment on the
evidence is shown by the jury's question. The jury had a question regarding Instruction
32.

(Tr., p.371, L6 - p.380, L 11.)

During deliberations, jurors asked the court,

"Instruction 32: Is inducing, causing or permitting opportunity, to witness an act of
sexual conduct, sufficient cause to establish guilt on point 3?

That is to say, if we

conclude the victim did not actually see any sexual conduct, is point 3 satisfied for
finding of guilt?" (R, p.230 (emphasis in original).) Instruction 32 deals specifically with
the allegation of sexual abuse of S.T (R., p.217.) The jury's question ultimately turned
on whether they believed that S.T was the victim. S.T, in her testimony, told the jury
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did not see Mr. Rodriguez masturbate and therefore was not a victim of sexual
, p.230, L.25 - p.231, L.3.) Ms. Kallin's testimony, coupled with the Court's
and Detective Bryant's summary, is the only evidence that S

witnessed

her father masturbate. The jury, if it believed S.T., would acquit Mr. Rodriguez of the
charge involving S.T. By convicting Mr. Rodriguez, the jury had to believe the Court's
admonition instead of S.T.'s testimony.

Therefore, as it spoke directly to one of the

elements of the offense, the district court's admonition influenced the jury. Moreover, as
the district court's comment addressed an essential element of the offense, it shifted the
burden of proving Mr. Rodriguez guilty away from the State. As such, the district court's
statement impacted Mr. Rodriguez's constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial
jury. See White, 97 Idaho at 711-12
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that when the district court
comments on evidence, there is prejudice since there is ·'the great possibility that such
an expression will influence the jurors." White, 97 Idaho at 711-12. That conclusion is
evident from the record in this case. Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that the
jurors, being influenced by the district court's statement that the video is only to be
considered against Mr. Rodriguez for charges involving S.T., abandoned their otherwise
reasonable doubt as to whether the State had proved all the elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, the error prejudiced Mr. Rodriguez, and the
district court's comment on the evidence constituted fundamental error. Thus, the
resulting conviction should be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above this Court should vacate Mr. Rodriguez's
and remand to

district court for further proceedings.

DATED this 20 th day of October, 2015.

AARON J. CURRIN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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